Some fallacies in Ronfeldt and Arquilla's article

While they do make some valid points about the changing nature of warfare, some of R and A's assertions are either strikingly naive or too obviously emanating from their own presumable ideological narrative. To their credit, the timing of the article (2001) does account for some of these fallacies that are more evident in retrospect. I'll give some examples.

- From the very beginning they talk about the "dark side" (terrorists, druglords and other villains) and "bright side" (social activists, Zapatistas, Black Bloc anarchists and other presumably decent folk) of netwar, which is a ridiculously reductive (or doctrinaire) way of looking at things. People who go to initially peaceful protests and end up beaten by the cops because anarchists show up and cause trouble might disagree with the authors' naively idealistic portrayal of the Black Blocs. A lot of left-wingers see Black Bloc anarchists simply as ideologically confused middle-class troublemakers who travel around Europe looking for opportunities to stir up some aggro. On the other hand, what about groups like Hamas or FARC? Are they good or bad guys? They could be considered either social radicals or terrorists (and in the case of FARC, drug smugglers as well).

- They misinterpret the significance of acts of netwar such as the Battle of Seattle as examples of a dominant type of conflict. The Battle of Seattle and the subsequent anti-G8 protest-turned-riot in Genoa (which I'm surprised they don't mention) gave the authorities the excuse to encroach on civil rights and to deal more repressively than before with dissent. If anything, authoritarian and fascistic tendencies in Europe have become stronger after Genoa.

- "The network appears to be the next major form of organization - long after tribes, hierarchies, and markets" - wait a minute, but aren't tribes and markets deeply hierarchical?

- "Many centuries ago, for example, the rise of hierarchical forms of organization, which displaced traditional, consultative tribal forms, was initially attended, in parts of the world, by the rise of ferocious chieftains bent on military conquest, and of violent secret societies run according to rank" - this made my day. Where do these guys get their historical information? Video games?

- They mention the "new generation of social revolutionaries, radicals and activists" whose "identities and loyalties may shift from the nation state to the transnational level" - this is almost as bad as the previous quote. What do they mean by "new"? Like, for example, 19th century socialist or anarchist internationalists?

- "The Zapatista movement [..] shows that social netwar can put a democratizing autocracy on the defensive and pressure it to continue adopting reforms". Oh, really? I would love to hear about some socially progressive reforms undertaken by the Mexican "autocracy" as a result of Zapatista pressure.

- "Deterrence and coercion will not disappear entirely as tools of statecraft; but, more than often, persuasion will have to be tried". This is little more than liberal wishful thinking. The Russians have been very "persuasive" in Chechnya, haven't they?

- "For the United States and its friends and allies, one challenge will be to learn to network better with each other" - oh, god, not the Eurocentric "multipolar world" argument again (admittedly, this was 2001). Maybe it's just personal bias, but this sort of argument makes me cringe.

- but here's the WORST paragraph in the whole text: middle of page 25. For one thing, I can't understand why any educated person would quote Samuel Huntington uncritically (after all, he's basically a far-right loon with a disturbingly reductive understanding of history, the academic equivalent of Ann Coulter). And the "broad contention between Western liberal ideas [...] versus Muslim convictions" is a concept that doesn't really make sense. There is no single set of "Western" or "Muslim" values. Furthermore, free market economics and globalization can cohabit perfectly well with sharia, face veils and beheadings - think Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. As for the "terrorist mindset" being "tribal, medieval and absolutist" and "challenge the 21st century with 13th century ideals" that's also a bit laughable. 13th century Baghdad was probably more cosmopolitan and progressive than any place in Europe. And radical Islam is based more on a form of extremist egalitarianism than on "absolutist" principles.

- "But while the United states may have the edge in the 'battle of the story'..." - but do they? The neoconservative ideological assumptions that influenced Bush's foreign policy aren't dominant any longer even in the US, let alone the entire world.